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LAWYER COMMENTS
THE BRICKER AMENDMENT IN CANADA
... a Rose-coloured Optical Illusion
Thomas Franck*
It is not infrequently pointed out by the advocates of con-
stitutional amendments restricting the treaty powers that just
such restrictions as are envisioned by the Bricker Resolution1 are,
in fact, already the law in Canada, and that the Dominion has not
only managed to "get along"-but has actually moved forward
with great speed in terms of international importance.
The Canadian arrangement is frequently eulogized by the
advocates of amendment as a model of constitutional horse-sense
and practicality. Such damning praise is richly undeserved. The
resemblances which appear to link the Canadian treaty powers and
the Bricker Amendment are neither all substance nor all illusion.
It can, however, be said that those which are shadow are irrele-
vant, and those which are substance are a source of regret to
most Canadians. In neither instance is the analogy a very happy
one.
There are, of course, important constitutional similarities be-
tween the two nations. Both Canada and the United States are
products of a federation of colonies; both constitutions are the
result of compromise; and both nations still face the problem of
protecting "states' rights." 2  These constitutionally-constant fac-
tors make comparison logically feasible.
Comparisons, when they are made, are, of course, always
directed at the famous section two of the Bricker Resolution. 3
This contains two entirely unconnected propositions which appear
to have nothing more fundamental in common than the co-owner-
ship of a verb. The first proposition requires that all treaties,
before they may be considered to have altered the domestic law
of the land, must first have been legislatively enacted.4 The
* Assistant Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Nebraska.
1S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1953).
2 In the case of Canada, the courts have been so generous to the pro-
vinces that it is really federal rights which need protection. For the
leading cases on this problem see, Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law
(1951).
3 "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States
only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty."
4 This would amend Art. VI of the Constitution which provides that
".. all Treaties... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.. ." The
amendment does not, however, make all treaties non-self-executing. Those
dealing solely with international legal relations and requiring no domestic
enforcement need not be legislatively enacted.
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second proposition requires that such enacting legislation be passed
by the legislature which, in the absence of a treaty, would have
jurisdiction over the particular subject-matter.5
Let us examine these two propositions in the light of the
Canadian analogy.
PROPOSITION ONE: TREATIES MUST BE LEGISLATIVELY
EXECUTED BEFORE THEY BECOME DOMESTIC LAW
The senate committee reporting the Bricker Amendment
stated categorically :6
In the British Commonwealth of Nations ... a treaty does not be-
come domestic law unless there is separate legislation by the
legislative body.
This is generally correct, though subject to exceptions, as we shall
see. Then, however, the committee lumbers to a conclusion:
This amendment would place the United States on a par with
these other nations of the world by requiring legislative action
before a treaty becomes effective.
It is quite true, of course, that in Canada (and the other
nations of the Commonwealth) "... the Crown cannot alter the
existing law by entering into a contract with a foreign power.
Where... a treaty provides that certain rights or privileges are
to be enjoyed by the subjects of both contracting parties, these
rights and privileges are, under our law, enforceable by the courts
only where the treaty has been implemented or sanctioned by
legislation rendering it binding upon the subject."'7
Is this not exactly what the Bricker Amendment would do?
It is not. The right to enter into solemn treaties with other
nations is in Canada the sole prerogative of the executive. The
process calls for no legislative participation whatsoever except
when the executive seeks to bind not merely the country as a
whole in international law, but also the individual subject in
domestic law. Only then is legislation required.
In the United States the right to enter into treaties is, how-
ever, not the exclusive right of the executive. The legislature
participates in the process of ratification-and in a very import-
ant way, for whether or not a treaty is self-executing,s it cannot
G This would nullify the decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920) which held that a migratory bird conservation law passed by
Congress to enforce a treaty made with the United Kingdom was valid
under Art., I, § $ of the Constitution even though the subject matter of
the legislation was normally within the jurisdiction of the states.
6 Sen. Rep. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1953).
7 Lamont, J. in Re Arrow River and Tributaries Slide and Boom Co.
Ltd., [19 3 21 2 D.L.R. 250, 260. See also Note, 29 Can. B. Rev. 969 (1951).
$ For a discussion of this distinction see Whitton and Fowler, Bricker
Amendment-Fallacies and Dangers, 48 Am. J. Int'l L. 23 (1954).
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be ratified until after it has received the approval of two-thirds
of the Senate.9
Thus in Canada, domestic law is protected against executive
alteration by treaty through the device of requiring legislative
enactment of any treaty provisions which are to have municipal
effect. This requires a simple majority of both houses, as does
any legislation. In the United States, the arbitrary executive al-
teration of domestic law by treaty is guarded against by requir-
ing that no treaty becomes binding without the consent of two-
thirds of the upper house. The Bricker Amendment does not sub-
stitute the Canadian system for the American, but superimposes
the one on the other. In order to become domestic law all treaties
would have to receive the support first of two-thirds of the Senate
and then would still require Canadian-style legislative enactment.u
It ought also to be noted that in Canada there are exceptions
to the rule that international agreements do not affect domestic
law unless enacted into legislative form. In the cases of Rex v.
Brosig" and Rex v. Kaehler and StolskP2 the court was asked to
entertain claims by Canadians against German prisoners of war
in Canada. It was noted that "the Geneva Convention of 1929 is
a part of the law of Canada."'13 An Ontario court in deciding Re
Drummond Wren'- electrified Canadian observers by holding a
restrictive covenant on land to be against public policy, and by
breaking that "unruly horse" with quotations from the United
Nations Charter, the Atlantic Charter, various treaties, agree-
ments, and covenants and even the constitution of the Soviet
Union. This importation of treaty law into the domestic law "by
the back door" has not, however, been repeated, and its standing
9 U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2. This analogy reveals the raison d'etre of the
United States executive agreement, for just as there are in Canada instru-
ments of international agreement which are of no legislative interest, so
there are in the United States matters of external relation which ought
not to require senatorial participation.
10 The executive agreement must not, of course, be used to wakc law.
That delegation will be construed narrowly by the courts is indicated in
the recent decision of United States v. Capps, 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.
1953).
11 [1945] 2 D.L.R. 232.
12 [1945] 3 D.L.R. 272, 277.
13 The court could, however, also have reached its decision through an
interpretation and application of Wartime Regulations P.C. 4121/193 No.
7, 53, 63.
14 [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674.
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as a method of determining public policy is now in doubt.6 There
is, however, no doubt whatsoever that private domestic rights in
Canada may be affected by certain other executive acts, such as
recognition, 16 or declarations of immunity.'7
PROPOSITION TWO: LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT MUST BE
UNDERTAKEN BY THE OTHERWISE APPROPRIATE LEG-
ISLATURE.
If the analogy between the first proposition set forth in the
Bricker Resolution and the procedure actually followed in Canada
is illusory, if not seriously misleading, the analogy to the second
proposition is more accurate.
The Canadian Parliament is invested with no extraordinary
treaty-enforcement powers, except perhaps in the event of an
"emergency."'-' Canadian treaties, if they are to be enacted into
domestic law, must be enacted by the legislature normally vested
by the constitution with jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the treaty. The enacting legislation must be legislation which, in
Senator Bricker's terms of reference, "would be valid in the ab-
sence of a treaty."
This has not always been the situation in Canada. Until
1937, the Canadian law respecting treaty enactment followed close-
ly that of the United States. 9 The fundamental document of the
Canadian confederation, the British North America Act of 1867,20
states:
Sec. 132: The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have
all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations
of Canada or of any Province thereof, as part of the British Em-
"S See Re Nobel and Wolf, [1948] 4 D.L.R. 123; [1949] 4 D.L.R. 375,
and [1951] 1 D.L.R. 321. It is interesting to note how the U.S. Courts
have disposed of the problem of the efficacy of the U.N. Charter on the
municipal law. See Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1950),
aff'd on different grounds, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
16 See Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456, and [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 556
where the court said, ". . . the Courts in questions whether a particular
person or institution is a sovereign must be guided only by the statement
of the sovereign on whose behalf they exercise jurisdiction."
17See Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q.B. 149, 158 where the
court argued, "When once there is the authoritative certificate of the
Queen through her minister of state as to the status of another sovereign,
that in the courts of this country is decisive."
16 The "emergency doctrine" has undergone many phases of judicial
popularity. Its most recent revival was briefly suggested in Canadian
Federation of Agriculture v. A.G. of Quebec, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 689.
1 Supra note 5.
20 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 132, 1867.
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pire, towards foreign countries, arising under treaties between
the Empire and such foreign countries.
The close relation this section bears to the "necessary and
proper" clause21 of United States Constitution is self-evident. Un-
der it the Federal Parliament was fully competent to enact any
treaty-implementing statutes even though their subject matter
might otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the provinces.22
Conflicting provincial statutes were held to be invalid.23
With the signing of the Treaty of Versaille and the separate
entry into the United Nations of the various Dominions, the in-
stitution of the "Empire treaty," already long a virtual fiction,
rapidly disappeared and Canada began to speak to other nations
not as one part of a unitary Empire, but in its own sovereign
right. Its treaties ceased to be "Empire" treaties and became
purely "Canadian" treaties.2
If this development seems natural enough today, it could not
possibly have been anticipated by the Fathers of Confederation
who, in 1867, drew up the deed for the union of the British North
American colonies. Consequently, there is no provision in their
"constitution" for the enforcement by Parliament of anything but
the "Empire Treaty."
In the Aeronautics case25 the Imperial Privy Council, then
Canada's highest court of appeal in civil matters, hinted that it
might not extend Section 132 to treaties entered into by Canada
in its own non-Imperial right. The debacle finally came in 1937
in the case A.G. of Canada v. A.G. of Ontario,26 in which the court
was faced with legislation27 of the Federal Parliament enacting
into domestic law the obligations assumed by Canada in adhering
to the I.L.O. Conventions:
21 Art. I, § 8.
22 Federal powers are set out in § 91, and provincial powers in § 92 of
the British North America Act.
23 Rex v. Stuart, [1925] 1 D.L.R. 12. The court held that under § 132
the Dominion parliament had the power to enact the Migratory Birds
Convention Act, 1917, even though the subject matter of the legislation
would ordinarily have fallen within provincial jurisdiction. See also A.G.
of B.C. v. A.G. of Canada, [1924] A.C. 203, and Re Control of Aeronautics
in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54.
24 The Treaty of Versaille was signed by five British plenipotentiaries
and one from each of the Dominions and India. They all signed in the
name of the Imperial Crown, but by virtue of Art. I, part I of the Treaty
the Dominions were all seated separately in the League of Nations.
25 Re Control of Aeronautics in Canada, supra note 23.
26 [1937] A.C. 326.
27 The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, 1935; the Minimum
Wages Act, 1935; the Limitation of Hours of Work Act, 1935.
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There is no existing constitutional ground for stretching the com-
petence of the Dominion Parliament so that it becomes enlarged
to keep pace with enlarged functions of the Dominion Executive2s
Thus, the court declared :2,
If the new functions affect the classes of subjects enumerated in
s. 92, legislation to support the new functions is in the compet-
ence of the Provincial Legislature only ... While the ship of state
now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters, she still
retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part
of her original structure.
Imagination droops her pinions. With this decision, the Privy
Council presented Canada with a reasonable facsimile of the
famous "which" clause of the Bricker Amendment.
It is well to remember that this provision was written into
the Canadian Constitution not by the will of the people as ex-
pressed by Parliament, but by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in London-an Imperial court to which, as a result of
recent legislation, Canadian appeals may no longer be taken.30
The strong reaction against just such decisions as this31 had not
a little to do with the decision to abolish the appeals. This, how-
ever, was a case of late barn-door closing. Once such a provision
has been judicially inscribed into the British North America Act,
it becomes far more difficult to erase than is any mere amendment
to the United States' Constitution.3 2
If the analogy between the judicial amendment to British
North America Act and the "which" clause of the Bricker
Amendment were wholly valid, it would still not be a convincing
argument in favor of either. It is currently difficult to explain
to ourselves, let alone other nations, why Canada is forced to be
2SLord Atkin at 352.
29 Lord Atkin at 352 and 354.
30 Supreme Court Act, 1952, R.C.S. c. 259 §§ 54(1),(2),(3). It
must in fairness be noted, however, that there is no indication that the
Canadian courts would have resolved the problem of interpreting § 132
with any greater liberality.
31 See articles collected in 15 Can. B. Rev. 393-507 (1937). Prof. Kennedy
refers to it as a "judicial labyrinth" and adds at 418: "To carry into
the field of external contractual relations the divisions of power set out
in section 91 and 92 seems to be of doubtful validity in point of law,
suicidal in point of government efficiency, and to involve the frustration
of Canada's achievements in political autonomy and international status."
The Sirois Report on Dominion-Provincial Relations goes so far as to sug-
gest that it is "inconceivable that an international convention should be
formulated as part of a colourable attempt by the Dominion to encroach
upon provincial jurisdiction." Supra note 2, at 184.
32 See Gerin-Lajoie, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (1950).
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a mere spectator in the codification of human rights. It is frus-
trating to Canadians who have just graduated from a benevolent
Empire to assert their international sovereignty to find that sove-
reignty now hog-tied by a benevolent constitution. However, the
analogy is far from perfect.
There are, of course, only ten Canadian provinces, not forty-
eight; and thus the possibility-though by no means the prob-
ability-of common legislative action for treaty enforcement
does exist. It could hardly be said to exist in the United States.
Moreover, as has already been pointed out, the Bricker Amend-
ment requires legislative action not, as in Canada, by either the
states or by the Federal legislature, but by both where state juris-
diction is involved.
It must also be noted that in Canada a serious minorities
problem intertwines the issue of provincial rights. These rights,
as set out in the British North America Act, are the constitutional
guarantee of the sanctity of the French Canadian heritage and
culture. The French Canadian will not entrust these rights to
the sole protection of the Federal Parliament, for there he is a
minority. He instead looks for his protection to the provincial
autonomy of his native province of Quebec. In the United States,
on the other hand, the states' rights champions represent an un-
disputed majority in both houses of Congress, as the passage of
the Tidelands Bill and the support for the Bricker Resolution
demonstrated. States rights is a universal rallying-cry in the
United States, and not, as in Canada, the refuge of a regional
racial and religious minority. Therefore the American Congress,
unlike the Canadian Parliament, seems eminently suited to the
task of protecting the vital division of functions between state
and federation.33
Finally, though it is dangerous to generalize in this regard,
it might be ventured that the British North America Act in some
respects is more favourable to federal enactment of treaty obliga-
tions than is the American constitution. "Aliens," for example,
perhaps the most frequent subject of international agreements,
are by the British North America Act-but not by the American
Constitution-assigned exclusively to the federal jurisdiction.3 1
In the final analysis, however, the utimate distinction is the
33 "If you can't trust the President, the Senate, the Congress, or the
Courts, who, in Heaven's name can you trust?" Parker, The American
Constitution and the Treaty Making Power, Wash. U.L.Q. 115, 124 (1954).
34 Section 91(25). As for the court's interpretation of the scope of this
section see: A.G. of B.C. v. A.G. of Canada, [1924] A.C. 203; Brooks-
Bidlake and Whittall v. A.G. of B.C., [1923] A.C. 455; Cunningham v.
Tomey Homma, [1903] A.C. 151.
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least subtle one: the United States is not Canada. It is not a
nation of some fourteen million people. It does not have a power-
ful protecting neighbor to the south. Nor is the United States,
like Canada, a nation less than ninety years old, exercising sover-
eignty in the field of foreign policy for only three decades, and
still groping its way toward adulthood. Canadians do not like
their drowsy, frowzy mechanism, but they can still afford it, or
perhaps they can be excused for their youthful failing. But for the
United States to seek to emulate this Canadian groping, or worse,
is a Freudian delight: a craving, understandable but dangerous in
these troubled times, to retreat to national pre-nativity.
